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Good intention will always be pleaded for every
assumption of power.... [T]he Constitution was made to
guard the people against the dangers of good intentions.
There are men in all ages who mean to govern well, but
they mean to govern. They promise to be good masters,
but they mean to be masters.
-Daniel Webster
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There are more than two hundred different forfeiture statutes,
covering literally everything from soup to nuts. Each state has at least two
forfeiture provisions, i.e., one civil and one criminal, with some states
having more. New York, for example, boasts no fewer than fifteen
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separate forfeiture statutes, fifteen different ways for the government to
seize and forfeiture your property.
The civil forfeiture statutes have been the most controversial and
have caused most of the stir during the last several years. In general, they
provide to law enforcement agencies or assistant United States Attorneys
the authority to file a civil lawsuit against the offending property in civil
term.
I. HISTORY OF CIVIL FORFEITURE
Civil forfeiture laws are actually an anomaly in American law.
They empower law enforcement agencies to seize money or other property
they believe has been used in, is intended to be used in, or is proceeds of
criminal activity. There is no need for a conviction before seizure or
forfeiture. In fact, the property owner does not have to be charged with a
crime. Civil forfeiture prosecutions are brought in rem against the
culpable or guilty property. Since the property is guilty of the criminal
activity, the legal fiction goes, the property is being seized and punished.
No individual is being prosecuted. Therefore, fundamental constitutional
protections such as the presumption of innocence, having the government
convict you of the charge instead of you proving your innocence, and the
right to be free from unjust private property takings by the government
quite simply do not apply. Compounding this is that the procedures
claimants must follow to contest a forfeiture are remarkably complicated,
even for seasoned attorneys, and therefore give the government every
advantage.
Unlike "criminal forfeiture statutes, which require a conviction
before property can be taken from an individual, civil forfeiture laws
require only a showing that agents have probable cause to believe that the
property was used or intended to be used to facilitate a crime, or that it
represents the proceeds of a crime. It is difficult to conceive of a lower
standard relating to criminal law. Civil forfeitures, after all, are criminal
proceedings, no matter what the Supreme Court has held, with the
government as plaintiff, a crime forming the basis of the action, and the
property being guilty of involvement in a crime. This is especially
troubling when you realize that, by and large, seizures are premised upon
the essentially unchecked discretion of a cop.
Where did these laws come from? Despite being relatively new to
us, the concept of civil forfeiture was acknowledged even before the
Greeks. Some cite to the Bible. In Exodus, chapter 21, verse 28, it is
written: "If an ox gore a man or a woman that they die, then the ox shall
be surely stoned, and his flesh shall not be eaten. But the owner of the ox
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shall be quit." The perfect civil forfeiture? Not really. Unlike in a true
civil forfeiture, the Biblical sovereign did not acquire the offending
property or its value. Nor did society benefit by eating the ox. Rather,
this was social justice, meted out to discourage revenge from the
deceased's family.'
As our predecessors traveled through the generations, they adopted
many of the Biblical practices. Revenge was the common thread.2 Rome
had its Twelve Tables.3 The Greeks followed closely behind.4 And Britain
had its common law. Indeed, at common law, civil forfeitures were in the
nature of a deodand, the spiritual predecessors of forfeiture statutes.5
Derived from the Latin phrase Deo Dandum, meaning, "to be given to
God," 6 the deodand itself originated in pre-Judeo-Christian practices.7
These practices, similar to the Talmud's interpretation of the goring ox
passage, reflect the view that the instrument of death is the accused and
that religious atonement is required. Property or its value was given to the
1. Jacob J. Finkelstein, The Goring Ox: Some Historical Perspectives on Deodands,
Forfeiture, Wrongful Death and the Western Notion of Sovereignty, 46 TEMP. L. Q. 169, 180-
181 (1973). Of course, were the owner aware of the dangerous propensity of the ox, the result
would be different, both today and in Biblical times.
But if the ox were wont to push with his horn in time past, and it hath been testified to
his owner, and he hath not kept him in, but he hath killed a man or a woman, the ox
shall be stoned, and his owner also shall be put to death.
Exodus 21:29.
According to the Talmud, the use of the phrase "and its flesh shall not be eaten" is intended
as a prohibition against receiving benefit from the animal. This prohibition becomes effective
from the moment the offending animal is convicted, even prior to its stoning. See TALMUD,
TRACTATE BABA KAMMA 41a. Thus, the Biblical source for the notion of forfeiture does not
contemplate a scheme under which a governing body or agency benefits from the use of the
guilty property. See Steven L. Schwarcz & Alan E. Rothman, "Civil Forfeiture: A Higher Form
of Commercial Law?, 62 FORD. L. REV. 287, 290 (Nov. 1993).
2. OLIVER W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 34 (1881).
3. 1 ScoTr, THE CIVIL LAW 69 (1932). See also W. DURANT, STORY OF CIVILIZATION,
(1972). "If a guadruped causes injury to anyone, let the owner tender him the estimated amount
of the damage; and if he is unwilling to accept it, the owner shall ... surrender the animal that
caused the injury." 7 TWELVE TABLES 1, translated in 1 SCOTr, THE CIVIL LAW 69 (1932).
4. "We banished beyond our borders sticks and stones and steal, voiceless and mindless
things, if they chance to kill a man; and if a man commits suicide, bury the hand that struck the
blow afar from the body." AEschines the Greek (389-314 B.C.E.) as quoted in the DRUG
AGENTS' GUIDE TO FORFEITURE 2. See also OLIVER W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (1881);
Ex Parte Lange, 85 U.S. 163, 168 (1873).
5. OLIVER W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (1881); Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht
Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 681 (1974). See, Note, Bane of American Forfeiture Law -
Banished at Last7?, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 768, 770 (1977).
6. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 681 n. 16 (1974).
7. OLIVER W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1-38 (1881).
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Crown "with the belief that the king would provide money for masses to
be said for the good of the dead man's soul, or insure that the deodand was
put to charitable uses."8 For the kings, however, the motivation was
hardly spiritual. It was pure, unadulterated greed. Sound familiar?
In medieval times, the scope of forfeiture was absolute. Known as
"forfeiture of estate," it deprived the offender of all personal and real
property.9 Subsequently, under the guise of redressing a loss caused by
criminal activity, civil forfeiture became a premium source of revenue for
the Crown in common law England.'0 Centuries later, long after the
religious purpose of the deodand had ended, the practice remained a source
of revenue for the Crown and was further supported as a deterrent to
negligence." The final justification, however, remained revenue, and lots
of it. It was fundraising at its best. Things were so frustrating for the
commoner, and lord alike, in merry old England that, bowing to their
pressure, one of the concessions granted in the Magna Carta was the
creation of what was called the "year and the day" rule: The king held
real property for non-treasonous offenses of one year and a day, after
which time the property would revert to a tenant's lord. 2  Personalty,
however, would escheat to the Crown.
When the British left home and settled a New World called
America, they brought with them many of their old, indeed despised,
customs. Remarkably, too, when a custom, formerly distrusted, was seen
from the opposite side of the fence for the first time, it looked much better.
This was true with forfeiture. The first Congress of the United States
abolished forfeiture of estate for federal offenses in 1790,13 and the Federal
Constitution protected property through both the Due Process Clause 4 and
a specific limitation on the scope of forfeiture in the context of treason."'
Nevertheless, the forfeiture tradition was maintained in the colonies
8. Pearson Yacht, 416 U.S. at 681. Deodand was abolished by Parliament in 1846, and
remedies for wrongful death developed in its place, with damages paid to those harmed by a
person's death rather than to the State through the forfeiture of the offending property.
9. United States v. Grande, 620 F.2d 1026, 1038-1039 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
919 (1980).
10. Finkelstein, supra note 1, at 169.
11. Torrance G. Reed & Joseph P. Gill, RICO Forfeitures, Forfeitable Interests and
Procedural Due Process, 62 N. C. L. REV. 57 (1983).
12. MAGNA CARTA, cl. 32.
13. Act of Apr. 30, 1790, § 24, 1 Stat. 117. This provision is currently codified at 18
U.S.C. § 3563.
14. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
15. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 2 ("prohibiting [ftorfeiture except during the life of the
person attained").
[Vol. 4:385
Kessler
through the maritime and customs laws, the reason why some of today's
more powerful federal forfeiture laws are codified in the admiralty laws. 6
The founding of a new nation did little to change these ancient traditions.
Almost immediately following the adoption of the Constitution, ships and
cargo were made subject to forfeiture under federal law. 7 The concept
made sense then. Our fledgling Republic depended on customs duties for
almost all of its revenue, and the ship owners who failed to pay the import
duties on the cargo were the same people from whom we had just declared
our independence! They were our enemies, not our citizens, and most of
them were half a world away. In that context, there could be little to
debate regarding the propriety of seizing and forfeiting their property.
Forfeiture quietly remained on the books until, one day, President
Reagan's staff figured out that these laws could be used and abused as high
powered weapons by law enforcement in the War on Drugs. The rest, as
they say, is history.
II. THE DRIVING FORCE BEHIND TODAY'S FORFEITURE: MONEY
One of the most alarming aspects of our current forfeiture scheme
is that it permits law enforcement agencies to keep the proceeds of their
forfeitures. This creates an overwhelming financial incentive for abuse,
one that would tempt even the most honest cop. Probably the most
remarkable example comes from Arizona. In one county, a statute
provides that a police officer will receive a salary as long as there are
enough funds in the forfeiture account to pay his salary. The local media
coined this collars for dollars. Enough said.
Among the many courts that have expressed grave concern about
these and other forfeiture practices is the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.
In 1992, the Court, traditionally very conservative, said it was
"enormously troubled by the governments' increasingly and virtually
unchecked use of the civil forfeiture statutes and the disregard for due
process that is buried in those statutes. " "
Other federal and state courts have echoed similar concerns. In
United States v. One Parcel of Property,9 the Eighth Circuit stated: "We
16. The English Navigation Acts in the 1600s required that all commodities shipped to the
colonies be transported on British vessels. A violation of these laws resulted in the forfeiture of
the illegally carried goods as well as the ships that transported them, a dear price to pay for an
upstart industry in the colonies.
17. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 683 (1979).
18. United States v. All Assets of Statewide Auto Parts, Inc., 971 F.2d 896, 905 (2nd Cir.
1992).
19. United States v. One Parcel of Property, 964 F.2d 814, 818 (8th Cir. 1992).
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are troubled by the government's view that any property, whether it be a
hobos hovel or the Empire State Building, can be seized by the government
because the owner, regardless of his or her past criminal record, engages
in a single drug transaction." Abuse also was a concern in Jones v. United
States Drug Enforcement Administration,2° where the district court held
that "the statutory scheme as well as its administrative implementation
provides substantial opportunity for abuse and potentiality for corruption."
The court continued with a pointed, and telling, observation: "The law
enforcement agency has a direct financial interest in the enforcement of
these laws. . . . The obviously dangerous potentiality for abuse extant in
the forfeiture scheme should trigger, at the very least, heightened scrutiny
by the courts when a seizure is contested."21
On the state level, at least one high court, familiar with forfeiture
matters, has noted its concern. In Wohistrom v. Buchanan,22 the Arizona
Supreme Court recounted the threat of forfeiture statutes upon an
individuals due process rights.23
Yet, it has remained for two other courts to put the facts of the
instant case in perspective. The Fourth Circuit observed:
One of the most potent weapons in the government's war
on drugs is its ability to obtain the civil forfeiture of
property that aids violations of the drug laws.
Congress has given this weapon increased power,
expanding the war to every piece of real property involved
in the narcotics trade. Yet even warfare is conducted by
rules. It is the judiciary's responsibility to ensure that the
civil forfeiture penalty fells only those property interests
which spring rightly and justly into its reach. While we do
not doubt that the anomalous circumstances of this case
20. Jones v. United States Drug Enforcement Administration, 819 F.Supp. 698, 724
(M.D. Tenn. 1993).
21. Id.; see also United States v. $191,910 in United States Currency, 16 F.3d 1051, 1069
(9th Cir. 1994) (disparity between government's and claimant's burdens in forfeiture proceedings
"involves a serious risk that an innocent person will be deprived of his property"); United States
v. That Certain Real Property, 798 F. Supp. 1540, 1553 (N.D. Ala. 1992) (discussing inherent
problematic due process issues relating to civil forfeiture and government's unchecked use of
civil forfeiture statutes).
22. Wohlstrom v. Buchanan, 884 P.2d 687 (Ariz. 1994).
23. See also In re 1986 Chevrolet Corvette, Ariz. Lexis 78, 169 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 30
(Ariz. 1994) (expressing concern over the government's increasing power in the area of
forfeiture).
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render it something of a rara avis, even the rarest of
species deserve shelter under the law's aegis ...."'
Most notably, the United States Supreme Court recognized the
government's direct pecuniary interest in the outcome of forfeiture
proceedings. In United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property,5
Associate Justice Clarence Thomas, one of the Supreme Courts most
ardent conservatives and the government's strongest supporters, wrote of
his "distrust of the Government's aggressive use of broad civil forfeiture
statutes." "I am disturbed," he continued, "by the breadth of the new civil
forfeiture statutes . . . which subjects to forfeiture all real property that is
used, or intended to be used, in the commission, or even the facilitation, of
a federal drug offense." 26  Notably, the Justice went on, "ambitious
modem [forfeiture] statutes and prosecutorial practices have all but
detached themselves from the ancient notion of civil forfeiture."27 Hence,
"it may be necessary . . . to reevaluate our generally deferential approach
to legislative judgments in this area of civil forfeiture."2
Sadly, there is good reason for the distrust. Under the guise of
attempting to recoup the costs of crime and crime prevention, from 1985 to
1996, the federal government has secured more than $5 billion in forfeited
proceeds, with another $1.5 billion in the pipeline. 29 The United States
Attorney's office in the Southern District of New York collected more than
$420 million between 1985 and 1994. Indeed, in 1994 alone, they brought
in close to $50 million, $17 million more than their annual budget. The
Eastern District of New York, during the same period, collected more than
$31 million, plus another $70 million in civil judgments, settlements,
criminal fines and assessments. Their operating budget is $26 million.
Even our deficit-oriented government has figured out that when your $26
million investment shows a $100 million return, you are doing something
right. In short, the forfeiture laws have permitted the government to
become a "full financial partner and participant in what is unquestionably
the largest business in the country. ',30
24. United States v. Two Tracts of Real Property, 998 F.2d 204, 213-214 (4th Cir. 1993)
(emphasis supplied).
25. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43 (1993).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Susan Adams, Forfeiting Rights, FORBES MAGAZINE, May 20, 1996, at 96.
30. STEVEN L. KESSLER, CIVIL AND CRIMINAL FORFEITURE: FEDERAL AND STATE
PRACTICE § 1.01, 1-2 (Clark 1993 and Supp. 1998), quoting Sinoway, et al., Current Trends in
Asset Forfeiture (California Attorneys for Criminal Justice, 1992).
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The extent of the government's financial stake through the use of
the forfeiture statutes came to light through released Department of Justice
memoranda. In 1989, the Acting Deputy General, Edward S. G. Dennis,
Jr. sent a memorandum indicating the need to meet the department's
forfeiture budget: "If inadequate forfeiture resources are available to
achieve the above goal, you will be expected to divert personnel from
other activities or to seek assistance from other United States Attorneys
offices, the criminal division and the executive office for United States
Attorneys. ""
In 1990, Attorney General Dick Thornburgh warned all federal
prosecutors that the department was far short of its projection of $470
million in forfeiture deposits with only 3 months remaining in fiscal 1990,
and that they must increase the volume of forfeiture actions:
We must significantly increase production in order to reach
our budget target. . . . Failure to achieve the $470 million
projection would expose the Departments forfeiture
program to criticism and undermine confidence in our
budget projections. Every effort must be made to increase
forfeiture income during the remaining three months of
[fiscal year] 1990.
Federal prosecutors realized the conflict of interest and skewing of
priorities created by the forfeiture statutes. In 1993, after a new
administration was installed at the Department of Justice (DOJ), the former
director of the DOJ Asset Forfeiture Office, Michael Zeldin, remarked:
The intelligent thing to have done would have been to pick
our cases more carefully and not overreach. We had a
situation in which the desire to deposit money into the asset
forfeiture fund became the reason for being of forfeiture,
eclipsing in certain measure the desire to effect fair
enforcement of the laws as a matter of pure law-
enforcement objectives.32
In addition, the Department of Justice gives positive recognition
and incentives to United States Attorneys offices on the basis of the amount
of assets they seize. As Myles Malman, a former federal prosecutor from
Florida, said: "There is nothing inherently wrong with rewarding people
for the assets they seize. But there has to be clear communication that they
31. Stephen Labaton, Seize Property in Crime Cases Causes Concern, N.Y. TIMES, May
31, 1993, at Al.
32. Id.
[Vol. 4:385
Kessler
shouldn't sacrifice good judgment and conscionability for statistics. The
system is subject to abuse. ,33
This aggressive forfeiture policy has caused and continues to cause
abusive results. The Pittsburgh Press published a series of articles in
August 1991. Following a ten-month investigation, the paper uncovered
more than 400 instances of innocent people who had to forfeit money or
property to federal authorities. More recently, the Arizona Tribune and
the Orlando Sentinel have uncovered similar abuses.34  Representative
Henry Hyde, R-Ill., recently estimated that about eighty percent of the
people losing property under federal civil asset forfeiture laws are never
even charged with a crime.35 Despite a potential claimant's lack of a nexus
to illegal activity, the forfeiture process goes on simply because many
claimants do not have the resources to challenge federal authorities.
Economist Sam Staley, President of the Urban Policy Research Institute,
noted that "[m]any [claimants] lack the resources and sophistication to
fight a prolonged court battle ... ,36 This comes as no surprise to federal
authorities, since, statistically, if they seize and hold the property, the
forfeiture process itself will force the claimant to abandon his or her claim
more than eighty percent of the time.
This government-sanctioned policy directing an agency, whenever
possible, to seize property to meet budget projections is reflected in the
Department of Justice's incentives for using this process and the statistical
knowledge that at least eighty percent of the claimants run out of the
financial resources and energy to fight the government and go away. This
has resulted in all seizing agencies retaining seized property even if an
investigation reveals that the property involved is not associated with illicit
activity or the property owner is an innocent owner. Not only is this
policy de facto outright theft, but it also amounts to a clear violation of the
Fifth Amendments Due Process Clause.
The broad campaign of the Justice Department to abuse the
forfeiture statutes indicates a systematic conspiracy to indiscriminately
deny the due process, equal protection and First and Fourth Amendment
rights of citizens. This is possible because the forfeiture statutes do not put
the initial burden on the government to institute proceedings promptly,
upon notice, with an opportunity to be heard, and show not only probable
cause, but lack of innocent ownership or other defense by proof beyond a
33. Id.
34. See KESSLER, supra note 30.
35. HENRY HYDE, FORFEITING OUR PROPERTY RIGHTS: IS YOUR PROPERTY SAFE FROM
SEIZURE? (The Cato Institute, 1995).
36. Carl Horowitz, INVESTORS BUSINESS DAILY, Dec. 9, 1993, at 1.
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reasonable doubt. Given the cumulative abuses, the statutes are
unconstitutional as applied.
III. PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE FORFEITURE REFORM
After the Supreme Court last term made a mockery of our
Constitution in Bennis v. Michigan37 and United States v. Ursery,3" House
Judiciary Chairman Henry Hyde, a Reagan Republican from Illinois,
introduced the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act (H.R. 1835). 39 He and
Representative John Conyers, a Carter Democrat from Michigan and the
ranking Democrat on the Committee, have joined hands on this one, in an
attempt to remedy some of the worst problems affecting federal civil
forfeiture laws.
Some of the important changes in the new bill are:
1) Place the burden of proof on the government to prove that,
by clear and convincing evidence, the property is subject to
forfeiture.
2) Provide for the appointment of counsel for property
owners who cannot afford lawyers to challenge forfeitures, paid
for from the Federal Asset Forfeiture Fund.
3) Clarify the innocent ownership defense, most specifically
to state that an owner who takes reasonable steps to prevent others
from using the property for criminal activity can get his property
back.
4) Eliminate the requirement that owners post a bond before
being allowed to challenge the action. What a concept! Your
house has been seized, your business has been shut down, all of
your money has been seized or frozen, and, before you are
permitted to challenge the seizure, you have to post a bond of
$5,000 or ten percent of the property's value, whichever is less.
5) Extend from 10 to 30 days the time for property owners to
file a claim for the return of their property.
37. Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S.Ct. 994 (1996).
38. United States v. Ursery, 116 S.Ct. 2135 (1996).
39. This is the successor to H.R. 1916.
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6) Require the government to institute judicial forfeiture
proceedings within ninety days after the filing of a claim
7) Permit property owners to sue the government for
negligence in handling or storage of their property, if the property
is not ultimately forfeited.
8) Provide federal courts with the ability to grant possession
of the contested property to the owner during the pendency of the
forfeiture proceeding, if possession by the government during the
action would cause the owner to suffer substantial hardship (such
as preventing the functioning of a business or leaving an owner
homeless).
As originally enacted, this bill goes a long way toward correcting
the abuses experienced under the current structure. Not surprisingly, the
Department of Justice has fought Congress, and fought hard, to change the
bill, introducing its own version of a reform measure. No hearings have
been conducted regarding the DOJ-drafted H.R. 1965, nor has the bill
been subjected to public scrutiny or intensive committee review. At sixty-
nine pages, it is fifty-four pages longer than H.R. 1835. Quite simply, it
mocks the reform effort of H.R. 1835.
It is noteworthy that H.R. 1965 is supported by no organizations
other than the Department of Justice and its client agencies, all of whom
have a direct interest in expanding their forfeiture powers. As illustrated
above, forfeited assets serve as supplemental budget funds which go
directly into the agencies coffers.
A review of the following passages in H.R. 1965 reveals that its
passage is worse than no reform at all.
1) It permits the government to seize and hold private
property even without probable cause, while it uses depositions,
interrogatories and other discovery mechanisms to justify its
seizure and after-the-fact filing of a complaint. This also imposes
costly pre-trial discovery burdens on the innocent private property
owner.
2) It defines proceeds so broadly as to include gross receipts
of an offense, without any allowance for the cost of legitimate
goods and services provided by the offender, e.g., the otherwise
innocent merchant. The only relief provided is in unduly limited
number of fraud cases. But this does not apply to wire and mail
fraud, where RICO or money laundering activity is involved
1998]
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Congress charges that are prevalent in a large number of
regulatory and other white collar crime indictments.
3) It permits the pre-trial restraint of substitute assets. This
restraint has never before been authorized by statute and has been
specifically rejected under numerous theories by every circuit court
addressing the issue since 1991. Among other things, this would
prevent the charged individual from retaining counsel and paying
for the defense with his or her own assets before being found to
have committed the crime with which he or she has been charged.
4) It limits the definition of innocent owner or third party to
purchasers of goods and services, thereby expressly seeking to
overturn Supr6me Court precedent including donees, banks and
other innocent, bona fide sellers of goods and services.
5) It restricts the appointment of counsel for indigent
claimants to cases meeting Star Chamber procedural requirements,
an anathema to American law. The claimant requesting court-
appointed counsel must submit to wide open cross-examination by
the federal prosecutor, on any issue, including the merits of the
case, before an appointment can take place.
The DOJ proposal is abusive and unfair. If reform is indeed
desired, H.R. 1965 should be rejected in Congress, and the bi-partisan
supported H.R. 1835 should be adopted.
IV. FORFEITING ASSETS OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES
So how do these expansive laws affect assets outside the United
States? The major case in this area is United States v. All Funds on
Deposit in Any Accounts.'
In All Funds, the government sought funds on deposit in the
claimant's name in bank accounts in England. The District Court found
that it had in rem jurisdiction over foreign accounts, and granted summary
judgment for the government. Claimant appealed. The Second Circuit
affirmed, holding that: actual or constructive control of property was
required for in rem jurisdiction, and the district court had constructive
control and therefore properly asserted in rem jurisdiction over funds in the
United Kingdom.
What was the basis of the courts decision? Indeed, in rem
40. United States v. All Funds on Deposit in Any Accounts, 63 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 1995).
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jurisdiction over property that isn't even in your country that's absurd!
Not according to the Second Circuit.
The court began with the statute. In response to the inability of a
district court to effect service outside its state's borders, Congress enacted
28 U.S.C § 1355(d), which provides that a district court "with jurisdiction
over a forfeiture action pursuant to subsection (b) may issue and cause to
be served in any other district such process as may be required to bring
before the court the property that is the subject of the forfeiture action."
This national service of process provision clearly conferred in rem
jurisdiction on district courts in forfeiture proceedings with respect to
property located within another judicial district in the United States."' But
no published opinion had applied § 1355 to property located in a foreign
country.
The government argued that § 1355 obviated the need for a district
court to exercise any degree of control over property to sustain a forfeiture
proceeding. According to the government, the only relevant inquiry under
§ 1355 is whether any of the conduct giving rise to the forfeiture
proceeding occurred in the district in which the action was commenced,
even if the property is located in a foreign country.
The Second Circuit rejected this argument. Although Congress
certainly intended to streamline civil forfeiture proceedings by amending §
1355, even with respect to property located in foreign countries, the court
did not believe that Congress intended to fundamentally alter well-settled
law regarding in rem jurisdiction. The circuit cited the Supreme Court
decision in United States v. James Daniel Good Real Propery,42 where the
Court said that "to institute and perfect proceedings in rem. . . . the thing
should be actually or constructively within the reach of the Court."43 This
control. is required in addition to the requirements of subject matter
jurisdiction and venue. Therefore, the issue for the Second Circuit was
control: whether the property was within the actual or constructive control
of the district court in which the action is commenced.
So where was the court's control? Brooklyn to Buckingham
Palace? The claimant argued that the District Court lacked any degree of
control because England was not obliged to remit the seized funds to the
United States. There was no legal entitlement of the United States to the
41. See United States v. $633,021.67, 842 F. Supp. 528, 531-32 (N.D. Ga. 1993); United
States v. Contents of Account No. 2033301, 831 F. Supp. 337, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
42. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43 (1993).
43. See also Republic Nat'l Bank of Miami v. United States, 506 U.S. 80, (1992) ("the
court must have actual or constructive control of the res when an in rem forfeiture suit is
initiated").
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funds, either under British law or a bilateral treaty, which might require
the British authorities to turn over the confiscated funds to the United
States. Since neither existed, claimant argued, there is no constructive
control.
But the Second Circuit disagreed. Notwithstanding the absence of
a binding obligation on the part of England to relinquish the funds, the
Court concluded that the district court had constructive control of the funds
by virtue of the demonstrated cooperation of the British government
pursuant to the 1988 Treaty and the Drug Trafficking Offenses Act. In
1990, the British High Court issued a restraining order freezing the funds
based solely on a request by the United States. In September 1993, at the
request of the United States Marshals Service, British law enforcement
officials served copies of the forfeiture complaint and warrant on the
British banks holding the funds. And in 1994, the 1990 restraining order
was continued by the High Court.
Therefore, the British courts and law enforcement acted essentially
as agents of the United States for purposes of this forfeiture action. Every
action of the British law enforcement officials was in direct response to
requests from American authorities. Although the Second Circuit refused
to delineate the precise scope of what will constitute constructive control in
future cases - and probably why this case has not been followed - the
court was satisfied that at least under these facts, the government met its
burden of demonstrating that the British government would turn over at
least a portion of the seized funds to the United States, thereby vesting the
district court with the requisite constructive control over the funds.
Noteworthy of review is In re F," a situation reversing the facts of
All Funds. In In re F, the British High Court enforced a forfeiture order
from an American court against British assets. The court ruled that
enforcing the American order would not be contrary to the interests of
justice pursuant to section 26(A)(1)(c) of the Drug Trafficking Offenses
Act of 1986. The court noted the importance to recognize the seriousness
and scale of drug trafficking, the underlying criminality in the forfeiture
proceeding, and the sophistication of asset concealment and money
laundering. The Vienna Drug Convention and the United States-United
Kingdom bilateral agreement of assisting in proceedings for the freezing,
seizure and forfeiture of the proceeds of drug trafficking require
international cooperation while simultaneously ensuring the maintenance of
44. This decision, dated November 29, 1996, is discussed extensively in British Court
Enforces U.S. Civil Forfeiture Order, 13 INTERNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT LAW REPORTER, 362
(Sep. 1997), and in US Civil Forfeitures Now Enforced in England, British Dependent
Territories, 1 ASSET PROTECTION INT'L 9 (Aug. 1997).
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the basic concepts of English justice.
The British court had no problem upholding the reversal of the
burden of proof in the American proceeding regarding standing or the
underlying issue of whether the funds were the proceeds of drug
trafficking. The court did not find these procedures so contrary to the
English concepts of justice as to prevent the court from reaching a
conclusion that enforcement of the forfeiture order is not contrary to the
interests of justice.
The bottom line regarding the law in this country on the forfeiture
of foreign assets in domestic litigation is that there appears to be no
legislative or judicial gloss or guidance other than the cases discussed.
Prosecutors cite All Funds as gospel, permitting the seizure and forfeiture
of foreign assets. Defense attorneys distinguish All Funds quite properly, I
think, on the facts, as, in fact, the Second Circuit did. What the courts
will do in the future is anyone's guess. What is interesting, however, is
the absence of any other published decision since August 1995. It appears
that neither side is willing to take the chance on this one just yet,
preferring instead to work out some compromise.
This area promises to be an exciting one to watch. Given the
questions relating to the constitutionality of civil forfeiture in normal, run-
of-the-mill situations in the United States, including the burden of proof,
admissibility of hearsay, Eighth Amendment concerns, questions of
standing, and protections more in line with criminal prosecutions,
expanding the results of these already questionable procedures could have a
chilling effect upon the Constitution as we know it. It remains to be seen
how far the courts are willing to bend to support the Executive Branch's
seemingly insatiable appetite in the name of the War on Drugs.
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